



The Retreat of Multilateralism in Peacekeeping and the Emerging Role of Regional Actors

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Summary

- In June 2023, the government of Mali requested the closure of the United Nations peacekeeping mission based in the state. One of the largest in the world, the request while acted upon, alarmed the international community. It was the start of a trend with three more states following suit: Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Somalia and Iraq.
- Peacekeeping has been an intrinsic part of the function of the UN since the 1950s; 83 missions and an additional 43 special political missions have been deployed over the duration of the UN's existence, with both formats designed to resolve conflict and develop vulnerable societies.
- The role of political affairs in UN missions includes fact-finding, hands-on mediation, preventative diplomacy and peacemaking. That function has been held by the Secretariat under the auspices of the Secretary General as an aspect of its 'Good Offices' role. Acting under a specific or general mandate, the Secretary General can intervene in points of conflict as an impartial actor in support of the maintenance of peace and security.
- Requests to end missions while conflicts are ongoing, have been justified for a range of reasons but collectively present a repudiation of multilateralism as it currently is enacted.
- This Insight is the first in a series that delves into the issues facing the UN and the multilateral system, including the return to the use of force, the fracturing of the multilateral system and the future of the UN's Good Offices.
- The Insight highlights that the resulting absence of the UN is leading to the rise of regional actors in addressing conflict, including the UAE during its tenure on the UN Security Council and subsequently in relation to its active involvement in relation to good offices for both Gaza and Ukraine, increasing diversity and regional participation in the arena which are largely positive.
- However, the replacement of the UN, with its capacity to deploy sizable complex missions based on a mandate of impartiality, raises difficult issues about the credibility of independent actors and the scale at which they could function.
- The Insight looks at peacekeeping in light of the request to close missions in Mali, Somalia, DRC, and Iraq. It focuses on what these developments mean for the future of peacekeeping and examines the possible roles of regional actors such as the UAE.
- It also makes the following recommendations to the regional governments to facilitate adaptation to the changing environment:

- Withdrawal of peacekeeping does not remove the need for the protection of civilians which will be an essential requirement both for their safeguarding and for regional stability.
- In relation to complex missions such as that in the DRC, it is possible that the UN is simply too big to fail, an aspect that needs to be addressed before collapse, not after.
- The essential role of Good Offices of the Secretary General has been adopted by regional organisations and regional actors have a vital role in the resolution of conflicts but will have to establish credible principles of impartiality and agreed patterns of behaviour to support that impartiality.

Glossary of Terms

‘Good offices of the Secretary General’: ‘Steps taken publicly and in private, drawing upon their independence, impartiality and integrity, to prevent international disputes from arising, escalating or spreading.’¹ The SG is supported in this endeavour through the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA).

‘Peacekeeping missions’: Through the administration of the UN DPPA, the deployment of 3rd party troops into a conflict area at the invitation of the host state to establish and maintain peace agreements and the cessation of conflict.

‘Stabilisation missions’: Empowered by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter, stabilisation missions incorporate greater use of force provisions into peacekeeping operations to quell conflict and to rebuild the apparatus of the state. These missions will generally incorporate regional actors into the stabilisation mandate.

‘Special political missions’: Missions which are authorised by the Security Council include panels or groups of experts, envoys, monitoring teams and special advisors with a reconciliation or conflict prevention mandate. It is a term which is also used to refer to missions with a political mandate often referred to as ‘statebuilding’ which incorporate the conduct of political processes such as elections, constitutional reform, security sector reform and assistance with the development of governance institutions such as a judiciary, police and human rights mechanisms.

The Issue

Since peacekeeping was undertaken as a practice by the United Nations (UN) in 1948, 83 missions with the stated aim of keeping the peace between previously warring factions have been established, with 11 currently in operation. These have been accompanied by 43 'special political missions, of which 11 are currently in operation. Combined, these peacekeeping/political missions provide support to over 385 million people, with 191 million people subject to civilian protection provisions.²

In the last two years, the United Nations, and with it the multilateral system, has faced a series of shocks leading to a widening perception that the international rules-based order is in disarray and is rapidly fracturing. While this is nothing new in the history of the institution, in truth the UN has not had a phase of peaceful functioning since its foundation, and yet the perceptions of the current crisis are not without substance.

The institution is confronted with not one, but two major conflicts—in Ukraine and the Middle East—yet has been unable to significantly influence developments in either, as regional and hegemonic powers have assumed the leading role. In addition, since the middle of 2023, the UN has been asked to close four of its largest peacekeeping and political affairs missions in Mali, Somalia, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and Iraq. While the organisation is bound to comply with such requests by national governments and has done so, what these developments mean for the future of peacekeeping is an open question and increasingly signal the withdrawal of patronage from key states in the international community.

The United Nations, created as the cornerstone of the multilateral legal order in 1945, placed conciliation and cooperation to the forefront of the international community, a reasonable response to two successive world wars. What multilateral organisations bring to the table when they act as institutions is the capacity to claim, in whole or in part, credible impartiality.

While the UN has a hierarchy in the form of the permanent membership Security Council, whose individual political objectives undoubtedly influence the organisation, decisions and actions take place based on collective agreement. The institution then implements those collectively taken decisions, providing an essential authority to those actions.

The integration of human rights protections beyond simply the preservation of life and the unique role of impartial 'good offices' sought to deliver stability and prosperity to those states in need. If often not achieved in whole or in part, in reality peacekeeping/stabilisation missions contributed immeasurably to those aims.

As the central role of multilateralism in the field of conflict resolution falters, space is opening for an increased role of regional actors in the sphere of mediation, a development which has been welcomed in many quarters. The UAE is one of several actors that sees itself as well positioned to act as a bridge builder. Indeed, it did so to significant effect during its Security Council membership in 2022-23. With noteworthy successes under its belt, including the adoption of the 'tolerance resolution' identifying hate speech as a driver of conflict and the passage of two humanitarian focused resolutions on the Gaza despite a deeply fractured Security Council, the UAE has a growing profile in this field.

While the expansion of the space has the potential to create a more regionally focused response to conflict resolution, the role of impartial actor is not easily maintained by state actors vulnerable to claims of self-interest. Further, the sheer logistic capacity and level of experience which the UN brings to the table in terms of conducting peacekeeping operations is not easily replaced.

The reasons for each state requesting the withdrawal of peacekeeping missions varies, but the overall effects are the same, with these states still gripped by conflict: increased instability, violence and human suffering.

This is the first Insight in a series that looks at the issues facing the UN and the multilateral system, including the return to the use of force, the fracturing of the multilateral system and the future of the UN's Good Offices. It focuses on peacekeeping in light of the request to close missions in Mali, Somalia, DRC, and Iraq. What these developments mean for the future of peacekeeping is an open question.

The first section of this Insight looks at a brief history of the UN, peacekeeping and its development in peace enforcement; the second section addresses the withdrawal of those missions and the retreating of the UN's Good Offices Role; and concludes with a brief discussion on the growing role of regional actors.

The Evolution of 'Making Peace'

While peacekeeping has become synonymous with the UN and consumes a significant percentage of the entity's budget, it is not outlined in the Charter. The Charter originally envisaged that all member states would make available forces to the organisation which would be overseen and deployed as a 'world military force' by a permanent Military Staff Committee. However, due to Cold War rivalries, while the Committee was convened, it was neither fully actioned nor was the establishment of the military force.³

Instead, the focus shifted to unarmed military observation missions with the first deployment taking place in Jammu and Kashmir in India and was followed by deployments in Palestine. Peacekeeping as an armed undertaking was first deployed as United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I) in 1956 to address tensions in Suez, but played the role of deterrence as opposed to offensive engagement.⁴

Operating under the mandate to "maintain international peace and security, and to that end... to take collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace" (Article 1), peacekeeping had, by the late 1950s, become a central instrument in the management of international conflict. As principal architect, Secretary General Dag Hammerskjold discussed peacekeeping as sitting within 'Chapter 6 ½' of the UN Charter, a concept which encompasses the pacific settlement of disputes in Chapter 6 and the Security Council powers within Chapter 7, which allows the use of force in the context of threats to the peace.⁵

He envisaged peacekeeping as a multilateral activity which strictly adhered to the three core principles: legitimacy through the explicit consent of the host state in line with Article 2 of the Charter; impartiality in practice and deployment; and a strict limitation on the use of force in self-defence only. The foundational principles of peacekeeping heavily relied on these attributes, with the characteristics particularly championed to distinguish peacekeeping from colonial trusteeship behaviour.⁶

These clearly stated and well understood principles have inevitably been much more complex in implementation. Initially, peacekeepers were deployed on the basis that they would not exercise military force even if they were comprised of military staff.⁷ The underlying principles guided a force which would act as a passive buffer zone between combatants 'where the belligerents' chains of command still functioned, [and] their commitment to resolution was assumed'.⁸

This changed during the deployment of troops to the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) in 1960. As the state itself disintegrated into civil war, the peacekeeping force evolved into a de-facto military force permitted to 'use force, if necessary in the last resort' beyond the strictures of self-defence.⁹ The Security Council authorised the UN peacekeeping operation, to: 'take vigorous action, including the use of the requisite measure of force'.¹⁰

The mission was highly controversial, with UN forces effectively acting as a participant in the conflict, over-reaching their mandate in a number of instances including an active role in the suppression of the Kataga succession. As a result, subsequent missions adopted significantly more conservative mandates where the use of force, if considered at all, was incorporated into the principle of self-defence, as proposed for the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL): 'Self-defence would include resistance to attempts by forceful means to prevent it from discharging its duties under the mandate of the Security Council'.¹¹

By the 1990s this more passive understanding of peacekeeping was fading, as the complex conflicts of Yugoslavia and Rwanda did not conform to any of these assumptions and increasingly put UN peacekeepers in the role of participants, with deadly consequences.

In June 1993 the Security Council authorised the use of force in three scenarios for the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) Peacekeeping Operation in the former Yugoslavia:¹² In the same month the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) was granted a specific mandate to use force beyond self-defence.¹³ Both missions came to an ignominious end. Following the killing of 24 Pakistani peacekeepers in Somalia, the Security Council authorised military action against those responsible, ultimately leading to the US engagement, via the UN, with Somali military actors as combatants, and subsequent US loss of life and withdrawal.¹⁴ Bosnia fared even worse. Lightly armed UN

troops, with their ambiguous mandate, failed to protect civilians within previously stated safe zones, leading to Serbian troops killing 15,000 men and boys at Srebrenica.¹⁵

In response, the UN commissioned the 2000 Brahimi Report on the reform of peacekeeping, the 2001 Responsibility to Protect Doctrine, and the 2008 UN Capstone Doctrine.¹⁶ All grappled with the use of armed force for the protection of civilians and the attendant political consequences to the UN and its principles of state sovereignty and political impartiality.¹⁷

Despite these tensions, all the mechanisms recommended the increased adoption of 'robust peacekeeping' models with a tolerance for the use of force beyond self-defence.¹⁸ In these restatements, the use of force was authorized, 'up to and including deadly force, to defend any civilian person who is in need of protection against a hostile act or hostile intent, when competent local authorities are not in a position to render immediate assistance'.¹⁹

They stressed that UN peacekeepers should 'be impartial in their dealings with the parties to the conflict, but not neutral in the execution of their mandate... [so that] even handedness towards the parties should not become an excuse for inaction in the face of behaviour that clearly works against the peace process'.²⁰

But it was the area of consent that resulted in the greatest tensions. Consent is intrinsically and exclusively granted by the state, and as such, discussions on consent are rarely focused on non-state actors, including separatist or rebel forces. This places UN troops in a particularly difficult position, whereby far from acting impartially, they are effectively tools for the state regardless of the political substance of the conflict in hand. Should the state forces fracture, peacekeepers are placed in an even more difficult position where shifting authority and allegiance compromise mandates. This has had a direct knock-on effect on the organisation's impartiality in the field, or perceptions thereof, a situation which arose in both the DRC and Mali. Where the UN has taken a position for robust peacekeeping, they have increasingly been drawn into the role of combatant, within increasingly fractured and volatile landscapes.²¹

The Growth of Stabilisation Missions

Security Council-mandated stabilisation missions under Chapter VII, where the use of force is more broadly tolerated, have become the preferred form of deployment. At the same time, the UN's human rights protections mandate expanded in line with 'liberal' principles as the UN actively engaged in democracy promotion, a new feature of the post-Cold War world.

Calling recalcitrant states to book, highlighting human rights violations and with the creation of the International Criminal Court, holding the real threat of prosecution for national political figures, became an active aspect of UN peacekeeping deployment. The fact that it did so at a time when increasingly the UN was not viewed as an impartial actor, created an ever more volatile sector.

As the role of peacekeeping has evolved in the post 9/11 world, a tension between use of force and the underlying principles of UN engagement evolved. The additional pressures of the War on Terror identifying and pursuing an 'enemy', are juxtaposed against a liberal mandate of human rights which cast an unwelcome spotlight on the activities of states, creating an obvious dichotomy. The attendant erosion of principle has exposed the United Nations to increasing vulnerabilities, including attacks on peacekeeping personnel and the characterisation of missions as biased and against the interests of the sovereign state. It was exactly this scenario which the UN faced in Mali, as an increasingly robust and politicised mission became embroiled in an equally increasingly complex political and military landscape.

The Mali mission (MINUSMA) was established in April 2013 as the international community's response to the outbreak of hostilities between north and south of the country and a subsequent military coup which replaced the civilian leadership.²² Supported by France, the government entered into a peace accord in 2013, which was the basis on which the peacekeeping mission was initiated, but this collapsed almost immediately.

It was a highly complex political environment, involving northern independence movements, jihadists and increasingly fractured governmental factions.²³ Established as a 'stabilization' and peace enforcement mission under Chapter VII of the Charter, as opposed to a peacekeeping mission, with the express aim to 'stabilise the key population centres... and, in this context to deter threats and take active steps to prevent the return of armed elements to those areas'.²⁴

The peacekeeping mission in Mali was one of the most extensive missions in Africa at this time, with over 13,000 troops and civilian police from 54 countries deployed throughout the state.²⁵ The mission was supported by 1,792 national and international civilian staff who undertook 12 substantive programme pillars including stabilisation and recovery, disarmament, justice, human and gender rights, political affairs and environmental protection. In addition, 20 UN agencies, providing humanitarian, developmental and economic assistance were deployed to support state institutions. In other words, the fabric of the state was supported by the UN.

From the outset, French forces worked alongside peacekeepers and continued their engagement with extremist groups in Mali, effectively integrating the UN peacekeeping operation into the counter-terrorist operation. French military engagement through Operation Barkhane, worked in parallel with MUNISMA and provided support to the mission in the form of convoy and air support, and intelligence services, including a joint working group on geospatial intelligence.²⁶

An all-sources information fusion unit (ASIFU) was established within MINUSMA under the command of MUNISMA's force commander. From 2013 to 2016 the ASIFU gathered information on counterterrorism from across the French-led military-coalition and also from UN deployed military police and civilian officers.²⁷ This exchange of information between French counterterrorism operations and the UN mission became a marker of its operation.²⁸ It was in this context that MINUSMA functioned. Following a coup lead by now interim President Assimi Golita, France was asked to withdraw its troops in 2022. They did so, completing withdrawal by August of that year.²⁹

Like MUNISMA, the United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) was also a stabilisation mission, which was partnered with regional forces from Malawi, South Africa and Tanzania as an 'intervention brigade' with the express aim of neutralising armed groups, in support of the government.³⁰ MONUSCO has become one of the world's largest peacekeeping missions with over 18,000 troops from more than 30 states deployed.³¹ The mission was based on the understanding that the government forces would themselves not fracture, which they subsequently did, deploying irregular militia and proxies into an increasingly chaotic conflict.³² By 2023 the UN was increasingly perceived as ineffective in their primary mandate of the protection of civilians and were simply not able to respond to the shifting alliances on the ground.

The United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNSOM) was established in 2013 to work alongside the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM – renamed ATMIS in 2022) with a mandate that included the provision of policy advice on governance, security sector reform, state capacity building, and human rights protections.³³ By mid-2024 ATMIS deployed 14,626 uniformed personnel, supported by a peak level of deployment prior to the winding up of the mission in December 2024.³⁴ All three missions had robust peacekeeping mandates, bringing them to the heart of each conflict.

Closure

UOn 16 June 2023 the Security Council met in session to renew the mandate for MINUSMA.³⁵ The renewal was a 'rollover', in other words the originating mandate established through agreement between the government of Mali and the UN outlining the activities and parameters of the mission and the tasks that the UN would undertake, were unchanged. The mandate was simply to be extended for another 12 months. As the session drew to a close, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Mali addressed the Security Council and in his opening statement requested the withdrawal of MINUSMA with immediate effect. The request, while not without precedent, took the Council by surprise, but it nonetheless complied with the request, and ordered the immediate closure of the mission.³⁶

On 1 September 2023 the government of the DRC sent a letter to the Security Council requesting the accelerated withdrawal of MONUSCO. In response to the request, a disengagement plan was adopted which included the withdrawal of peacekeepers from South Kivu by April 2024, which was duly undertaken.³⁷ Such was the surge in violence and instability that further withdrawals have been suspended.

May 2024 saw requests to close political missions from both the Governments of Somalia and Iraq. It was envisaged that the Somali mission will be re-established in January 2025 as the African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission (AUSSOM) as a transitional measure to full Somali control over the security sector.³⁸ While this transition was planned in detail, the request by the Government of Somalia to close UNSOM as the political wing of the UN mission, was completely unexpected.³⁹ The Security Council subsequently adopted a resolution transferring UNSOM's mandate to the United Nations Transitional Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNTMIS) which will close by 2026.⁴⁰

The request to close the United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq was more predictable because the political landscape has stabilised in recent years. Political transitions through elections, while imperfect have become well established, through a system of power-sharing based on the distribution of ministries on sectarian lines, and rates of violence as a previous hallmark of life in Iraq, have dwindled. In May 2023 the Security Council requested an independent strategic review of UNAMI which was completed in March 2024 and was followed by a resolution scheduling its closure in 2025.⁴¹ There is a very good argument that UNAMI reached the end of its natural life, a stance confirmed by the institutional review.

However, the requests to withdraw in the context of Mali, Somalia and Congo are not so easily understood, as reflected both in the size of the missions and the complexity of the conflicts which will now be left to run their course. The impact on the population of the withdrawal of peacekeepers whose job it was, albeit imperfectly to protect those populations, will be profound. But it is the closure and removal of the United Nations traditional role of 'good offices', of political mediation which threatens to have the biggest impact on the institution itself.

The End of Politics?

Following the statement of each request to withdraw and the acknowledgement of that request, has been an affirmation that the UN will retain a role in each country through the Country Team which is comprised of UN funds and agencies which largely focus on the humanitarian field. These include UNICEF, WHO, WFP, UNHCR, and UNDP, among others. While adept at the provision of humanitarian services and negotiating space for those services in conflict environments, none of these agencies have a developed political affairs mandate or capacity.

The role of political affairs officers deployed to the field includes, fact finding, hands on mediation, preventative diplomacy and peace-making. That function has been held by the Secretariat under the auspices of the Secretary General as an aspect of its 'Good Offices' role. While not mentioned in the Charter, the development of the role of Good Offices by the Secretary General is another Hammerskjold innovation and one which has sat at the heart of the UN's unique set of skills as an impartial actor.⁴²

Acting under a specific or general mandate, the Secretary General can intervene in points of conflict as an impartial actor in support of the maintenance of peace and security. Dispute resolution is an essential aspect of this function. In this, the office is supported by the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs which deploys political officers as mediators and fact-finding interlocutors to all Security Council mandated missions. These offices play an essential role in the functioning and implementation of the mandate and do so at a scale which is beyond the means of all but one or two members of the global community. The UN is currently providing political affairs support to 16 countries, with a collective affected population of over 366 million people. In addition, due to the operational principles of consent and impartiality along with transparent mandates, these officers largely function without controversy.

This function of the UN in this arena is largely irreplaceable, certainly on its existing scale. In addition to political affairs, each of the existing 22 missions has a human rights component. This aspect of UN peacekeeping/stabilisation has proved to be much more controversial in relation to host states. The human rights division at times brings unwelcome scrutiny and has in the past been accused of both hypocrisy and selectivity, due to the effective immunity from sanction of the Security Council permanent 5 members (P5).

In reality, the role of the human rights units in conflict environments is to protect civilians under some of the most desperate conditions the world witnesses: mass-killings, mass rape and mass destruction. There is no other multilateral entity that can undertake the kind of advocacy which the UN in this field can undertake, and while imperfect, we as a collective civilisation need to examine our values if we think this function is dispensable.

A New Regional Space

As UN peacekeeping and stabilization missions close, bilateral actors are vying to fill the void. Increased diversity and participation in the field of reconciliation and negotiations with an aim to ending conflict must be encouraged. For too long, expertise in this area has been attributed to countries and organisations from a narrow geographical area, leaving little space for regional voices, let alone decision makers. Regional actors bring extremely valuable historical, political and cultural awareness to the field, which at times have not been given sufficient weight.

The UAE is potentially one such actor and indeed is currently involved in the negotiations between Russia and Ukraine, reflective of an overall aim expressed at the beginning of the UAE's Security Council term. On joining the Council in 2021, the UAE began its membership with the stated aim of being a 'bridge builder' between the Global North and South, where southern interests were under-represented. In that role the UAE advocated for increased consultation with all interested parties on issues before the Council, improving regional inclusion and participation.

The UAE's informal role as the regional representative also came sharply to the fore in relation to the Council's response to events in Gaza, leading to the successful adoption of two resolutions (by a highly fractured Council): Resolution 2712 to increase protections to children in the conflict and resolution 2720 on scaling up and monitoring aid in Gaza. These resolutions followed the development of the 'Tolerance Resolution' identifying hate speech as a driver of conflict and the support of women's rights in Afghanistan, demonstrating the value and importance of regional voices.⁴³

Having delivered notable successes during the Security Council term, the UAE is well placed to act as mediator and indeed has had significant success in the field of prisoner exchange between Ukraine and Russia.

However, all bilateral actors will engage in this field with the key handicap of having to establish and maintain the perception of their impartiality and will be vulnerable to accusations of self-interest regardless of the reality. Notwithstanding what develops, addressing this issue will be at the core of establishing legitimacy for all actors. In the absence of the UN in the key areas of conflict resolution and peacekeeping, real reflection will have to take place to consider what can be credibly conducted bilaterally and what essential aspects of the UN must be preserved.

Conclusion and Recommendations

In many respects, the unique role, powers, history, and capability of the United Nations is irreplaceable, not least due to its longevity and size. While undoubtedly the UN needs reform, the complete fracturing and/or abandonment of key functions of the institution will not remove the need for those functions, which will simply have to be served by some other agreed mechanism.

All the countries discussed in this Insight had clear reasons for requesting closure of the missions, and certainly for Iraq and Somalia, there is a clear path forward in peace for their populations. However, where conflict is still active, such as in the DRC or Mali, withdrawal in real terms is the removal of vital safeguards for civilians, at a point of extreme vulnerability. Regardless of who or what undertakes it and what ideological approach they embrace, their protection should be at the forefront of efforts.

The essential aspects of peacekeeping, mediation, resolution, and stabilisation will require the assistance of the United Nations, or in its absence something which functions with many of the same attributes. Hundreds of millions of people rely on these services and in their absence are quite literally abandoned. Antipathy towards the UN or multilateralism will not abrogate the unique features of a multilateral organisation and the need for it to function in these areas. As the failure of withdrawal in Congo shows, in some respects the UN is irreplaceable, and missions are at times simply too big to fail in the context of the instability which results from withdrawal.

Regional actors should be encouraged to take a more proactive and engaged role in the resolution of conflicts, for the benefit of all. However, actors motivated by regional or altruistic impulses will have to establish credible principles of impartiality and agreed patterns of behaviour to support that impartiality. Extending this logic even further, coordination will also be essential and as such primary functions of the UN will be intrinsic to provide these services regardless of increased levels of independent or quasi-independent participation. The UAE in particular has developed a solid reputation as a bridge builder and a principled and impartial actor in its Security Council tenure, leading to significant participation as a negotiator in regional and international conflicts.

The essential role of Good Offices of the Secretary General assisted by the political affairs office, if no longer central to the Secretariat, will need to be developed as a specific skill by the UN funds and agencies. In this they benefit from the existence of a significant brains trust, it will be essential that this is captured and preserved.

Endnotes

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 41. S/RES/2682 (2023) & Report on the Independent Strategic Review of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq, presented to the Security Council via a letter from the Secretary General dated 26 March 2024, S/2024/270. S/RES/2732 (2024).
 42. The United Nations Handbook on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes Between States, UN Doc.
 43. OLA/COD/2394 & Declaration on the Prevention and Removal of Disputes and Situations Which May Threaten International Peace and Security and on the Role of the United Nations in this Field. General Assembly resolution 43/51, 5 December 1988.
- S/RES/2686 (2023), S/RES/2681 (2023) condemning Taliban restrictions on women and girls (co-sponsored by 91 countries).